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Abstract
In this paper, I examine long-term franchise contracts in
relation to franchise-termination laws. I conclude that,
given the scope for opportunistic behavior in franchise
relationships, we might expect to see both legal and extra-
legal structures governing the termination of franchise
contracts. This conclusion follows from the observation
that there are no legal or extra-legal mechanisms credibly
able to enforce all promises, particularly promises
concerning the franchisor's restraint over appropriating
sold franchises, the value of the franchise brand name and
the franchisee's good faith effort, leaving the franchise
contract seriously incomplete. If both parties could
guarantee all promises, opportunistic behavior would
disappear, in addition to the possibility of adverse selection
occurring and reducing the number offranchise contracts.
Adverse selection occurs when, not knowing the true value
of promises, trading partners substitute an average quality
signal. Above-average quality contractors then leave the
market, as it will not reward them sufficiently. Therefore,
the quality of legal and extra-legal enforcement
mechanisms is central to the nature of franchise
contractual arrangements. Typically, these arrangements
eschew complexity, which indicates the avoidance of
introducing further scope for argument and uncertainty
over the value ofpromises.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper contributes to the understanding of long-term franchise
contracts by examining three key features. First, contracts are frequently
restricted in law such that the franchisor's ability to terminate the franchise
contract is curtailed, possibly by a requirement for good cause. Second, the
governance of franchise contracts tends toward simplicity, with evident
limitations on the range of contracting devices that courts tolerate. Third,
extra-juridical management mechanisms, including those focused on
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arbitration, monitoring and enforcement, are important in franchising.' An
explanation for these features may be found using information economics.
Broadly interpreted, franchise contracts avoid unrestricted termination
rights, tend toward simplicity, and use well-defined extra-legal management
mechanisms owing to the scope for opportunism identified in the
economics literature and often referred to as a two-way moral-hazard
problem.2  In the sections below, I first examine the implications of
opportunism for franchise contracts before linking these to information
considerations and governance mechanisms. I draw on observations of
business practices and cases in law throughout the paper.
II. CONTRACTS, OPPORTUNISM AND THE PROBABILITY OF HOLD-UP IN
FRANCHISE CONTRACTS
In the terms used by Williamson 3 in his transaction-cost analysis of
firm asset specificity, bounded rationality, opportunism, and uncertainty all
affect long-term franchise contracts making ex-post 'hold-up' attractive to a
party. Opportunism may arise over specific investments or over the
enforcement of effort levels in a contract. Williamson emphasizes asset
specificity as the major driving force tempting opportunistic behavior in
contracting problems. Individuals may make highly specific investments,
committing them to a long-term contract. Not only is enforcement costly,
however, there are major difficulties in specifying all of the contingencies
present as well.
In economic terms, specific investments result in appropriable
quasi rents (pure economic surpluses going beyond a normal-profit return
on investment), the difference between ex-ante expected returns to the
investor and the amount that must be left in the contract ex-post to deter the
S. MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS (Russell Sage Foundation 1966); Antony W.
Dnes, A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 367 (1993);
Antony W. Dnes, Hostages, Marginal Deterrence and Franchise Contracts, 9 J. CORP.
FIN. 317 (2003); Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of
Litigation and Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD.
549 (2003).
2 See Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results, 23
RAND J. ECON. 263 (1992); Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, The Dynamics of
Franchise Contracts: Evidence From Panel Data, 107 J. POL. ECON. 1041 (1999);
James A. Brickley, Royalty Rates and Upfront Fees in Share Contracts: Evidence
From Franchising 18 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 511 (2002) (who finds that franchisors' profits
are improved by laws governing franchise termination, and that franchisees may also be
better off owing to the reduced threat of termination).
3 Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,
73 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1983); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM 31 (Free Press 1985).
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investor from abandoning the contract.4 Such investments therefore need
support, either through law, or, if the quality of law is insufficient, through
private enforcement mechanisms. Private enforcement is normally
considered to require 'hands-tying' through the posting of a 'hostage,' the
creation of offsetting vulnerability affecting the party who would otherwise
be tempted to practice hold-up and appropriate quasi-rents. If it is not
possible to rely on court enforcement of the original terms, or if it is
desirable to avoid court costs, or even to avoid alternative dispute
resolution, the hostage may be a cost-efficient enforcement mechanism. It
works by ensuring that the promisor has more to lose by cheating than by
sticking with the original terms: it deters opportunistic re-negotiation. The
penalty from cheating needs to be at least as large as the benefit from
cheating.
Careless choice of the hostage may set up an incentive for a trading
partner to appropriate it, which would be self-defeating. Implicit hostages
are less vulnerable to opportunistic appropriation by trading partners
compared with pecuniary hostages. The person holding the hostage should
not find it to be directly of value. A hostage needs to be an 'ugly princess'
in the terms of transactions-cost analysis.
Benjamin Klein 5 has developed work on asset specificity and hold-
up problems into a distinct analysis of 'probabilistic hold-up.' The analysis
is distinct because he regards private enforcement mechanisms as a means
to stabilize contracts within a foreseeable range of variation of market
conditions. Outside of the range, renegotiation, or breakdown of the
relationship, may be anticipated, and, then, enforcement of the original
contract where it was never intended to apply could be opportunistic. Firms
use private enforcement alongside court enforcement and renegotiate
contracts periodically, 6 as it is too costly to specify all contingencies in a
4 The quasi rent is the difference between ex-post returns on the total investment and
normal returns on the avoidable investment, and the appropriable part is governed by
the next-highest valuing user of the total investment. In their article, Vertical
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. &
EcoN. 297 (1978), Alchain, Crawford & Klein give an example of a manufacturer
investing in a plant with a specific use and earning a normal return by selling output to
a single buyer for a net revenue (after meeting avoidable costs) of $x. There may be no
scrap value for the plant, implying that the entire net revenue is a quasi rent once the
investment is made. However, if there is an alternative buyer of the output who values it
(net) at $(x-k), the appropriable part of the quasi rent is only $k - i.e. the original buyer
can attempt to drop the price by $k, after the manufacturer has made the investment,
before the manufacturer will switch to the alternative buyer. I give a simple numerical
example of hold up in ANTONY DNES, ECONOMICS OF LAW: PROPERTY, CONTRACTS
AND OBLIGATIONS 82 (2005).
5 Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self Enforcing Range of Contractual
Relations, 34 ECON. INQUIRY, 444, 456 (1996); Benjamin Klein, Transactions Cost
Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356 (1996).6 However, contract modifications are not enforceable without fresh consideration.
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contract and equally too expensive to figure out all the problems that may
need to be held in check by hostages.
For any hostage to be effective it must set the expected gain from
cheating equal to zero. This implies that hostages will be worth much more
than the actual gain when monitoring costs are positive: in terms of the
economics of law, the hostage may represent punitive damages. If there is
only a ten percent chance of poor standards being detected then ten times
the gain must be taken to render expected gain equal to zero: the contract
will always seem 'unfair' in this sense of obeying the general principle of
criminal deterrence.7 One question therefore concerns the extent to which
franchise termination laws, which usually constrain the franchisor's
prerogative to terminate the franchise contract, may interfere with good
governance by allowing poor franchisees to continue working in a chain.
Conversely, we may worry that an absence of such laws would permit the
franchisor to appropriate local franchise territories by opportunistically
contriving excuses to do so once a franchisee had a local business up and
running.
III. FRANCHISE CONTRACTS
The scope for opportunism in franchise contracts can take several
forms. 8 Chiseling by the franchisee on performance quality could take the
form of lower effort levels over things like cleanliness of the store, or the
quality of the product or service. A below-standard franchisee might still
receive profitable business if non-repeat buyers are attracted by the
reputation created for the brand name by the franchisor or other outlets.
The franchisor can practice post-contract opportunism over support levels
for franchisees-perhaps failing to provide sufficient centralized
advertising or neglecting the monitoring of quality standards throughout the
network. The franchisor can also attempt opportunistic repossession of
franchise territories by claiming problems with franchisee performance,
hoping to sell a franchise again or possibly to run a company store.
Most commentators conclude that cheating by the franchisor is
controlled by a likely consequential increase in operating costs. In
particular, if a franchisor had a reputation for appropriating franchises
opportunistically, it would become difficult to recruit new franchisees.
There are operating and monitoring cost advantages to franchising that give
value to the franchisor's maintaining a reputation for fair dealing. Although
7 Criminal law is the correct comparison as the economic analysis of tort law typically
assumes the probability of detection to equal one.
s This section is based on observations in Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and
the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978) at 227; G. Frank
Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 503 (1985) at 515; Antony W. Dnes, Franchise Contracts, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LAW AND EcoNoMics 1092, 1099 (B. Bouckaert & G. De Geest eds., 2000).
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franchisors must monitor network standards, they need not monitor day-to-
day operations at the satellite stores. Moreover, the present value of this
cost advantage over the life of the contract acts as a hostage. As far as the
franchisee is concerned, as long as the value of lost entitlement to the
franchise profit stream-the share of rents, is greater than the franchisee's
expected gain from cheating-a comparable hostage can reinforce
franchisee performance in good faith. Franchisors cannot insist on
arbitrarily high hostages, which would certainly deter chiseling-arbitrarily
high hostages could prove too tempting for franchisors, and franchisees
would never agree to them.
Franchise contracts typically require franchisees to pay lump-sum
fees to franchisors and to make highly specific investments in equipment.
The franchisor usually has the right to terminate the contract if the
franchisee is not maintaining quality standards. It is a common observation
that these contracts appear to favor the franchisor's interests and an obvious
question is why franchisees freely agree to such arrangements.
Of particular interest is Klein's argument that the franchisor's
contractual right to terminate the contract supports private enforcement
through the common requirement that franchisees lease their properties
from the franchisor. 9 The franchisee could be forced to move premises and
sacrifice valuable leasehold improvements, which would revert to the
franchisor as lessor. This gives the franchisor a hostage with which to
control franchisee behavior and enables monitoring to be reduced with an
associated cost saving. As I have previously observed, "[t]he franchisor
can require the franchisee to move and thereby impose a capital loss on him
up to the amount of his initial non-salvageable investment. Hence, a form of
collateral to deter cheating is created."' 10 Furthermore, in my work
surveying franchising practices, I noted that many franchisors avoid the
unconstrained use of lease-control as too much like putting a gun to the
franchisee's head.'"
More recently, Klein" has moved to the view that the rents
attached to the non-salvageable investment should be the focus in valuing
the franchisee's potential loss in cases where there are no legal constraints
on the franchisor's behavior. His reasoning is based on the claim that sunk
costs, or detrimental reliance in legal terms, cannot influence behavior, as
truly bygone expenditure is not relevant to future decisions whereas the
prospect of losing some of the rents is a current incentive. The argument
9 Benjamin Klein, Transactions Cost Determinants of "Unfair" Contractual
Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 356, 358 (1980).
'
0 Id. at 359.
" Antony W. Dnes, A Case-Study Analysis of Franchise Contracts, 22 J. LEGAL STUD.
367, 371 (1993).
12 See, e.g., Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9
(1995); Benjamin Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of
Contractual Relations, 34 ECON. INQUIRY 444 (1996).
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overlooks the influence of law in rendering expenditures recoverable or not,
but is most forcefully put in the following passage:
if the franchisor had made the specific investments ... but
the franchisee was earning the return ... the incentive on
the franchisee ... would be the same, i.e. the fear of loss of
the future return from these specific assets upon
termination. Whether the franchisee makes the investment
is irrelevant. While it may be easy to think of the loss to the
franchisee of these ... assets ... it is always the loss of the
present discounted value of the future premium (which may
include a future expected return on specific assets)
compared to the short-run extra return from not performing
that determines whether the franchisee performs.
13
Klein urges us to think of hostages in terms of the loss of specific assets but
does not give a precise definition of the "future premium" or "future
return". I consider a precise definition below, which broadly supports
Klein's view but does not support the argument that ownership of sunk
investment is irrelevant. The law can make a difference to what is, or is not,
sunk.
IV. HOSTAGES IN RELATION TO COURT GOVERNANCE
Hostages are used for private enforcement as an alternative to other
forms of governance and are influenced by the nature of those alternatives.
Legal constraints may influence the behavior of the franchisor. Klein notes
that franchisors might avoid charging initial fees because courts are
motivated by the unconscionability doctrine 14 and might prevent franchisors
from terminating contracts at will in cases where franchisees had invested
heavily in contract-specific assets.15 Removal of the franchisor's
prerogative over termination at will at the very least dilutes a hostage, as
enforcement becomes less certain. Some US courts, like the Supreme
13 Economics of Franchise Contracts, supra note 12, at 26.
14 U.S. courts may void a contract judged procedurally or substantively unconscionable
because of a severe inequality of bargaining power between the parties. The doctrine
originally arose in a case of add-on clauses in credit agreements. See Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). A good example of the
treatment of substantive unconscionability is the excessive pricing case of Jones v. Star
Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Spec. Term 1969).
15 English and Commonwealth courts have never properly adopted the
unconscionability doctrine and Klein's argument could not apply there. One cannot
have general explanations that could only be relevant in some of several similar
economies.
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Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Zapatha v. Dairy Mart,16 have allowed
termination at will without requiring good cause and not found termination
unconscionable in cases where it did not jeopardize a franchisee's initial
investment.
The truth is that we need to allow for a much wider range of
termination laws. There is considerable variation within American
jurisdictions, members of the European Union and other countries such as
Canada tend to constrain the franchisor's freedom, and it important not to
have a theory of hostages that could apply in some US states only.
Moreover, we need also to recognize that equity doctrines, such as a duty
toward dealing in good faith, and the unconscionability doctrine, as in
Zapatha v. Diary Mart, may also arise in some cases, even in states without
franchise termination statutes. 17 Among the states with such statutes, some
are more restrictive compared with others.
Franchise contracts generally allow termination with notice for
good cause, which indicates that contractors tend to select a good cause
requirement, rather than the equivalent of dismissal at will, as found in
labor law. The contract used by rental car company Avis18 is typical in
allowing the franchisee to give six-months notice to end the contract but
limiting the franchisor's rights of termination to cases of substandard
operation, contractual breach by the franchisee, and the franchisee's
insolvency, which all constitute good cause. 19 Termination for good cause
may be sufficient to support a disciplinary hostage but it gives much less
clear-cut disciplinary powers to the franchisor. It is also an elementary
point of contract law that courts can always use equitable doctrines to
award damages to a party suffering loss following perfectly legal
termination of a contract. 20
16 Klein cites Zapatha v. Dairy Mart Inc., 381 Mass. 284, 408 N.E.2d 1370 (Mass.
1980). The case actually tells us that the principles of unconscionability in the Uniform
Commercial Code were applicable by analogy to a franchise agreement in which the
sale of goods was a minor aspect, which is still a constraint on the franchisor (Id. at
291). The Court accepted that the termination clause of a franchise agreement,
authorizing the franchisor to terminate the agreement without cause on ninety-days
notice, was not, in the circumstances, unconscionable (Id. at 292).
17 See King of Prussia Power Equipment Co v. Power Curbers Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 463
(E.D. Pa.2001), a distribution case in which the court held that action for breach of
contract and breach of implied covenant could not coexist on the same facts.18 Avis Sub-license Agreement, undated, Clause 9.
19 The Zapatha case is an unusual one where the franchise contract allowed termination
at will, and implies (as is likely with diary sales or any fast-moving consumer goods)
that there would have been little or no detrimental reliance by the franchisee, or no
rational franchisee would have incurred sunk costs to enter into such a contract.
20 See, e.g., Goff-Hamel v. Obstetricians & Gynecologists, P.C., 588 N.W.2d 798 (Neb.
1999) (where the plaintiff recovered damages under promissory estoppel for
detrimental reliance in a terminable "at will" labor contract that the defendant offered
but declined to execute).
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Statutory restraints on termination at will, or alternative dispute
resolution mechanisms 2' designed by the parties themselves, both of which
usually require good cause, might also make hostage posting difficult. At
the very least, the costs of termination would rise for the franchisor,
possibly by requiring a waiting period until the current contract expires.
The requirement in the United States' Uniform Commercial Code
("UCC") 22 for good faith, together with statutes like the Automobile Dealer
Franchise Act,23 the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act,24 and the state
termination laws, create such restraints. Furthermore, although there are no
significant direct statutory restraints on franchisor termination rights under
EU law, contract-law codes in continental European jurisdictions
commonly limit termination rights to good cause.
Legal constraints may weaken self-enforcing mechanisms like
disciplinary hostages. Franchising is used less frequently in U.S. states
requiring good cause for the termination of franchisee contracts,26 and this
observation suggests that legal practice may make disciplinary hostages
impractical in many franchising businesses. This conclusion directs
attention to the other roles that hostages may play in supporting contract
stability-notably, giving trading partners a screening device to filter out
the unreliable contractor.
V. HOSTAGES IN RELATION TO ECONOMIC RENT
It is largely a rhetorical issue whether we regard sunk cost as a
useful measure of hostage posting. Ex-ante, expected quasi-rents include an
amount covering any expected sunk costs, and must exceed sunk costs to
give at least a normal return if the specific investment is to be induced.
Sunk costs may be regarded as important in the sense that ownership of the
specific investment defines the ownership of a part of the ex-post rent
stream, which goes to repay the original investment plus a normal return.
Ex-post, it is the rents that measure the bond.
A useful comparison can be made with the expectation damages
doctrine in the Anglo-American contract law. In cases of a buyer's breach,
for example, the seller can claim expected profits plus any sunk costs
("detrimental reliance") incurred in anticipation of completion of the
21 Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 549 (2003).
22 U.C.C. § 1-203 (1989).
23 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982).
24 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806 (1982).
25 CHRISTIAN JOERGES, FRANCHISING AND THE LAW 40 (Christian Joerges ed., Baden-
Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1991).
26 James A. Brickley et al., The Economic Effects of Franchise Termination Law, 34
J.L. & ECON. 101,101-132 (1991).
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contract.27 Simply to award lost profit would result in under compensation.
Just as expectation includes profit and reliance in law, ex-post quasi-rents
include normal profit, any ex-ante rents and sunk costs in contracts. In
short, the premium for good behavior includes an amount equal to the
anticipated return of all initial investments, provided that one owns the
investment. The part of the premium that returns the investment is
economic rent in the sense that any ex-post return on specific investment is
a rent. Furthermore, protecting the entitlement to rent in a contract gives
the law a role in supporting hostages, including a role in preventing
opportunistic behavior that would render the hostage infeasible.
Therefore, it matters which party makes the initial franchise
investment because doing so creates legal entitlements and property rights.
Ex-post, any profit stream above avoidable costs is a quasi-rent, but steps
taken ex-ante will determine how much of that rent goes to whom, and,
therefore, how much each party can post as a hostage. A franchisor making
the specific investment would expect a normal return, and might take some
of the additional rents. The rest of the future rent stream is a legal
entitlement from which the franchisee can post a hostage. If the franchisee
makes the investment, ex-post, the hostage will be all of the normal profit
plus any rents. In the case where the franchisee makes the sunk investment,
the franchisor may be able to vary the investment requirement,
contractually to create a larger hostage and deter more cheating, and, if
behavior is then altered and profits increase it does indeed matter who
makes the investment. It is common for franchisees to borrow against
housing equity to establish their businesses. If such businesses fail, they
may have a sense that there is more at stake for them compared with cases
where the franchisor has paid the (sunk) initial costs. Arbitration
procedures may be very important in that process of hostage design, and in
governing the circumstances in which hostages may be lost.
In any long-term contract, there will be many differently valued
opportunities for cheating. It really does not make sense for the parties to
post the whole rent stream to cover minor infringements of the contract.
This penalty would ignore the principle of marginal deterrence and would
carry the risk that the promisor would be indifferent between small and
large infringements of contractual conditions. Such indifference would
deter contracts that would otherwise be efficient, as the promisee would
worry that the steep penalty structure would cause a ratcheting up in typical
promisor failures. In general, it should be worthwhile for the parties to find
a governance structure that better matches penalties with damages. 28 For
example, even private governance should be expected to match the
structured penalties of criminal law.
27 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 12.10 (4th ed. 2004).
28 This still allows penalties to be raised to allow for low probabilities of deterrence.
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The hostage may also sometimes need to be extended relative to the
rent stream to be large enough to deter post-contract opportunism. As long
as the penalty is larger than the returns from cheating for a promisor, the
hostage is effective in relation to that particular type of opportunism.
However, this does not mean that the hostage is successful in supporting
exchange. It is still possible to attract parties with high expected values
from cheating or those who expect to discover exceptional opportunities to
cheat where the value exceeds the hostage. If the hostage is limited to the
available ex-post quasi-rent stream, it may not be large enough. A rents-
based hostage may cause a contract to attract promisors with high expected
values from cheating, which may destroy the value of the contract for the
promisee. 29 This may be shown with a simple example, which is again
based on franchising.
Just as the problem of the excessive discrete hostage could be
overcome by establishing a marginally structured series of private-
enforcement penalties, the problem of too little deterrence can, too, be met
by extending penalties beyond those given by the rent stream in the
contract. Hostages need to be whatever is required to deter opportunism in
a particular case. A way to increase the hostage is to design mechanisms
into the contract that increase the value of the specific investment to the
hostage posters. I call this procedure, the creation of "contractual
sunkness," which may be distinguished from the technical sunkness that
affects all specific investment.
Contractual sunkness cannot occur through unnecessarily
increasing the value of the specific investment, which might be attempted
by requiring a franchisee unnecessarily to trademark equipment or make
"special" franchise investments (e.g., useless ornaments). The problem is
that this raises costs and lowers rents; the penalty for cheating might
actually be reduced. This consideration suggests that when we observe
franchise-specific investments they are, in fact, genuinely needed for
business purposes.
Nonetheless, much necessary investment is only made sunk by
contractual means, rather than being technically determined. If franchise
fittings are trademarked, they cannot be easily transferred to another use,
whereas they might be easily transferred in the absence of trademarks.
Similarly, if franchise investments cannot be sold to another franchisee
without the consent of the franchisor, the investment is made specific by
contract and not by technology. The effectiveness of this hostage depends
on the franchisor's consent for sale.
29 A similar ("lemons") problem exists in financial markets when lenders are limited to
screening borrowers using only the rate of interest. The lenders may raise rates to
compensate themselves for the risk of the borrower's defaulting, but then, deter all but
those with no intention of repaying the loan from applying: a severe form of adverse
selection. Lenders need additional screen devices.
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Contractual sunkness carries the danger that a contract-specific
asset will be of direct value to the franchisor. Given the costliness of
formal legal systems, contractually sunk assets are typically protected by
measures safeguarding the franchisee against opportunistic seizure of the
assets. The contractual protection is usually based around independent
arbitration procedures and covers disagreements over costs, revenues, or the
justifiability of termination. Arbitration can also be used to govern the
imposition of penalties for lesser infringements of the contract where the
promisee does not wish to remove the entire rent-stream premium.
The examples of contractual sunkness cited so far do not enable the
hostage to be extended beyond the sum of initial investment, normal profit,
and rents in the contract. There is a contractual device, however, that might
well enable further extension of the hostage. This is where the franchisee is
required to agree to constraints on other activities, which will potentially
impose a penalty on the franchisee's income from other activities. Yet
these constraints will not affect the ex-post rent stream attached to the
franchise contract itself. An example of this is where a franchisor requires
a franchisee to sign a covenant restricting the franchisee's operations after
contractual termination. Usually, the franchisee cannot operate in the same
business in the local area for a period of one to two years. This hostage is
of value to the franchisee, who may already possess specialized and
localized business skills. It is of no direct value for the franchisor, if we
assume: (i) competitive entry into the off-brand supply into the market; and
(ii) franchisor indifference over which competent franchisee runs the
satellite business. Covenants do not affect the returns to the franchise
contract from due performance but rather, extend the contract into other
areas of the franchisee's possible activities. Similar covenants are often
used in employment contracts for personal services like hairdressing, or
within partnerships for professionals like lawyers and accountants. A
restrictive covenant is also useful because its value may grow as the value
of other hostage components fall as the contract ages. It affects the value of
the alternative occupation to which human and physical capital could be
moved.
VI. KEEPING CONTRACTS SIMPLE
Franchise termination laws are such a major issue that they warrant
some further analysis showing that the laws achieve a purpose of enhancing
simplicity in contracting. Let us examine a case where a franchisor takes a
franchise to market and it is known that the franchisor might try to
appropriate rents at a later date by opportunistic termination of the contract.
The franchise is effectively encumbered by a risk of franchisor malpractice.
The danger is that franchisees might be deterred from buying into the
franchise and posting their own hostages governing their own good
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performance. We can examine the effects of the "encumbrance" problem
by considering some principles from the economics of information.30
For our purposes, we assume that the franchise buyer's expectation
of the reduction in the value of the {ih franchise outlet, owing to the
existence of appropriation risk, is defined as EB[SJ, distributed over the
interval [0, S]. The seller has precise information, so that the franchisor's
expectation is Es[SJ = Si which is the true value. The use of expectations
over the change in the value of franchises following from encumbrances is
a convenient formulation in the analysis that follows. We assume franchise
outlets to be standardized, apart from the risk of appropriation. The
maximum value of an unencumbered franchise outlet (no appropriation
risk) is S which is common knowledge. The franchisee/buyer's knowledge
is influenced by search costs, C (encompassing legal research) and by
institutional factors. The buyer's valuation is determined by the number of
transactions in franchises (N), and jurisdictional characteristics, or qualities
(A). These jurisdictional qualities include the age of the legal system, and
whether it follows particular legal doctrines. A large number of
transactions, particularly if relative to a small number of franchise sales,
will tend to reveal appropriations over time. The known ease of enforcing
contractual promises should enhance the buyer's perception of the true
value of Si, aligning the buyer's valuation with that of the seller. Therefore:
E,[S,] : f(A, C, N)
(1)
where f '(C) < 0, f '(N) > 0, f '(A) > 0 and =f"(C)<O0,f"(N)<O, 0(A)<O,
indicating that the expected value will increase with older and more
numerous transactions, and decrease with additional search costs. Change
in legal doctrines, or the introduction of laws can influence perceptions and
values.
The buyer always has the option of not searching, in which case the
buyer assumes Si to be uniformly distributed over the interval [0,S], with
E'B[SJ = S/2. The buyer searches to improve information on the ith
franchise transaction when:
dCX, < EB[S]-S/2
(2)
In other words, the search (i.e., legal research) strategy is adopted when it
costs less than the value of the expected improvement in information. We
assume the search strategy dominates, for all franchise sales i = I ... n, and
the buyer's expectation over the value is given by the application of legal
research in a defined legal environment.
Turning now to interactions in the market for franchises, let us
assume that buyers and sellers agree on the valuation of an appropriation-
30 See Antony W. Dnes & D. Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Structure of
Servitude Law (2009) 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89 (2009).
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risk free franchise as Vi = V, i=1 ... n. The buyer's valuation of an
appropriation-risk encumbered franchise is therefore, (J-EB[SJ) V which is
offered at a price, P. The franchisor/seller's valuation is (1-Sd V. The seller
will sell appropriation-risk encumbered franchise outlets for P - (1-Sd V >
0, which indicates accepting the buyer's offer, if Si > EB[SJ. Some
encumbered franchises will not be sold, owing to the buyer's inability to
assess and offer a true value, given the quality of the surrounding
enforcement mechanism affecting the seller's promises, which implies
adverse selection if the buyer systematically underestimates the value of
franchised offerings.
Turning now to interactions in the market for franchises, assume
that buyers and sellers agree on the valuation of an appropriation-risk free
franchise as V = V, i=l ... n. The buyer's valuation of an appropriation-risk
encumbered franchise is therefore (1-EB[SJ) V, which is offered at a price,
P. The seller's valuation is (1-S) V. The seller will sell appropriation-risk
encumbered franchise outlets for P - (1-Sd V > 0, which indicates
accepting the buyer's offer, if Si > EB[Si]. Some encumbered franchises
will not be sold, due to the buyer's inability to assess and offer a true value,
given the quality of the surrounding enforcement mechanism affecting the
seller's promises. This implies adverse selection if the buyer systematically
underestimates the value of franchised offerings.
Franchisors may run more outlets than it is efficient for them if they
cannot credibly contract to refrain from opportunistic appropriation.3 1 In
such cases, franchise termination laws could act as a form of 'hands tying',
making it clear that a franchisor cannot appropriate outlets
opportunistically. The effect of this would be to increase royalty fees for a
franchisor consistent with empirical observations.32 The effect of restricting
franchisor termination rights is to rule out complicated assessments of
contract terms. Thus, a simplified contract emerges that is less prone to
opportunistic behavior by the franchisor because liability-rule-based court
governance is replaced by a property rule.
VII. SOME EMPIRICAL OBSERVATIONS ON PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT
MECHANISMS WITHIN FRANCHISE CHAINS
Once franchisors have sold franchised outlets, how do they
typically govern their franchisees? While termination laws may reduce the
likelihood that a franchisor will act opportunistically, incentives to a
franchisee may not be as strong. The observations that follow are drawn
31 See W. Bentley MacLeod, Reputations, Relationships, and Contract Enforcement, 45
J. ECON. LITERATURE 595-628 (2007) (noting that the underlying problem leading to
adverse selection is the moral hazard preventing credible guarantees being offered over
future behavior).
32 Brickley, supra note 2.
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from an empirical study that I carried out of private enforcement
mechanisms in franchise chains and show deterrence factors at work. The
study focuses on both explicit and implicit aspects of franchise contracts
and enforcement mechanisms. 33 Standardized questions were used to probe
for details of explicit and implicit enforcement aspects of franchise
contracts. The results, which are summarized in the table below, support
the claim that a schedule of penalties is applied within the rents available on
the contract. However, as also noted in the results, some penalties extend
enforcement beyond rents.
Franchisors were interviewed to obtain information about the
private enforcement mechanisms used in their dealings with franchisees.
For each franchise chain, I interviewed an average of three franchisees to
cross check the information provided by franchisors. Both franchisees and
franchisors were aware that their opposite numbers were to be interviewed.
Franchisors were randomly selected from trade directories and responses
provided by the fifty-seven participants are reported on the table below.
Franchisees were randomly selected within each franchise chain. The
procedure guards are far as possible against selection bias.34 In the table, the
sample is divided into 'dealer' (e.g., franchised Ford car dealerships),
'brand' (e.g., Avis), and 'other' franchises. 'Dealers' share the characteristic
that they sell the manufacturer's products. 'Brand' franchises revolve
almost totally around the franchisor's brand name, whereas 'other'
franchises are a miscellaneous group based on some other specialist input,
e.g. supply lines for generic parts used in service operations.
All of the franchisors found that they benefited from carefully
screening franchisees before taking them on. This process occurs early and
typically aims to discover which applicants are most likely to operate
honestly, work diligently, show business acumen, and so forth. There are
no cases in which the franchisor expects simply to write a self-enforcing
contract, sit back, and relax. In their responses, franchisors typically
describe their screening activities, which usually involve protracted
interviews and identifying the applicants for whom the company's franchise
systems and standard contracts 'would work.' This could be interpreted as
taking a probabilistic hold-up approach. This approach seeks to delimit the
range of operations and returns for which the franchise contract should be
effective.
13 These results were generated by semi-structured interviews with franchisors and
franchisees.
34 There is some bias (toward less representation of larger franchise chains) owing to
the failure of some large franchises to belong to trade associations.
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Table - Enforcement Mechanisms
Dealers Brand Other Total %
Screening 15 27 15 57 100
Exhortation 15 27 15 57 100
Arbitration 15 27 15 57 100
Fines 3 0 3 6 11
Formal Review/Notice 6 6 6 18 32
Competition 0 3 3 6 11
Lease 6 6 3 15 26
Non-renewal 0 3 0 3 5
Encouraged Sale 3 9 0 12 21
Buy Out 6 6 3 15 26
Termination 9 15 9 33 58
Restrictive Covenant 6 24 9 39 68
The franchisors stated that they found they needed to 'exhort'
franchisees to keep to the spirit of their agreements. Franchisors described
the frequency of exhortation as 'occasional' in almost all cases. The
intention here seemed to be the identification of minor transgressions of the
franchise contract. An example of a minor transgression is a quality failure,
such as a problem in honoring a sales warranty. The franchisor was usually
prepared to let the implied rent gain to the franchisee go retrospectively in
these cases, provided that the problem is corrected. The sanction on the
franchisee is partly the nuisance value of the exhortation but the franchisors
also appear to be trying to lower franchisees' expectations of succeeding in
infringing the agreement. This last point is of some importance because if
both parties entered contracts with the same expectations of detection
efficiency, there should be no infringements. Therefore, some form of
active management on this front is potentially valuable in stabilizing
contracts.
The interviews also reveal comprehensive use of arbitration clauses
in the contracts. The franchisors resorted to arbitration procedures to settle
some disputes, usually relying on the professional association, an
arbitration society, or, less commonly, a compulsory arbitration. The clear
motivation for arbitration mechanisms is to avoid protracted litigation.
Fines are comparatively rare with only eleven percent of
franchisors reporting use of these explicit financial sanctions. Even when
used, fines appeared to be of a form where the franchisor regained some
revenue that had been misreported in a relatively trivial fashion (e.g., in the
case of a window-blind company). Generally, product supply-not
necessarily manufactured by the franchisor-was involved. The difficulty
in using fines is that a franchisee may fear that there is an incentive for the
franchisor to contrive reasons to fine, which may pose recruitment
problems. Franchisees confirmed that it was indeed rare for fines to be
imposed to settle a dispute. When fines were used, they were limited to
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restitution of money rather than the imposition of punitive damages (i.e. no
allowance being made for under-detection). This avoidance of punitive
elements accords with contract-law principles rather than the idea of
criminal sanctions. Nonetheless, while rarely used, the fine is part of a
structured schedule of increasing penalties. This approach is similar to the
criminal law approach of creating marginal deterrence.
Almost one-third of franchisors undertook a formal review of some
aspect of franchised operations. This amounted to citing a contractual
infringement and giving notice to correct a deficiency. The steps taken
amounted to more than mere exhortation and required either imposing a
limit by which time a problem needed to be corrected or assigning a
temporary manager to assist with a solution. Virtually all the franchisees
reserved the right to forcibly persuade in this fashion, even if they have
never used it. Again, the purpose appears to lie in altering the franchisee's
perception of the range of circumstances over which the contract is
expected to hold. Rectification of fault avoids further penalty.
A potential penalty for the franchisor to impose is to open up stores
in competition with an errant franchisee. This was in fact rather rare, as
shown in the table. There were few cases where franchisees fell into
dispute, decided to leave the franchise network, and continued trading.
Franchisors decided to operate company stores locally, possibly motivated
by the difficulty of introducing a new franchisee into such circumstances.
Interviews with franchisees confirmed that competitive operation was an
extreme sanction that did not coexist with a continuing franchisor-
franchisee relationship.
Only just over a quarter of the sample revealed any control over the
franchisee's property lease by the franchisor. Although this type of control
has been understood as reinforcing hostages bound up in leasehold
improvements, other reasons can be found for such leasehold links. Lease
control is not important in the more recent view of hostages when compared
to rents. Moreover, leasehold improvements are prime examples of sunk
costs. The view submitted earlier in this paper, that a title to property gives
title to portions of rents, could give a hostage role to leasehold
improvements. Yet, it is difficult to prevent lease control from creating a lot
of power for the franchisor, as suggested by the near universal
condemnation of the practice by franchisees.
Only five percent of franchisors explicitly refused to renew a
franchise contract. In the table, the various penalties are listed in order of
toughness, which shows that non-renewal is viewed as a serious sanction
although not as tough as termination of the contract, for example. Allowing
the contract to simply end gives the franchisee time to plan and make
adjustments. The more frequent use of tougher forms of ending the contract
suggests that franchisors do not tolerate unsatisfactory franchisees long
enough to arrive at the non-renewal phase.
Franchise Contracts, Opportunism and the Quality of Law
Encouraged sales (21 per cent), franchisor buy-outs (26 per cent)
and terminations (58 per cent) were successively tougher approaches
franchisors took to removing seriously failing franchisees. Bear in mind
that the percentages refer to franchisors who admit to these events
occurring at least once, the underlying population is less than 10 per cent of
all franchisees. The most common reasons for encouraging a sale were that
the franchisee did not fit well into the franchisor's systems, or that there had
been too many conflicts. Such franchisees were allowed to take time in
finding a buyer who provided a net return on the franchise-specific
investment. Buy-outs normally occurred when a franchisee would
otherwise fail and the franchisor sought to avoid embarrassment.
Termination of a contract normally resulted when a franchisee was caught
defrauding the system. There was a clear correlation between severe
penalties for the franchisee with greater commercial damage done to the
franchisor.
A surprisingly high proportion of the franchisors had used
restrictive covenants with franchisees. These restricted the franchisee's
commercial activities in the location and same line of business for short
periods that had been found to be acceptable to courts, typically of between
six months to two years. The impact is to extend the loss of rents beyond
the franchise contract. The extension is potentially useful to increase
penalties for poor performance given a probability of detection that is less
than one. It may also be useful to maintain the value of hostages as the
contract ages and to deter cheating that might take out more than the
contract rents (e.g., selling misappropriated vehicles).
VIII. CONCLUSION
Generally, a disciplinary hostage can be based on any value that
contributes to offsetting the temptation to cheat over some aspect in the
contract. This should be interpreted in terms of marginal deterrence. At the
contract design stage, which is of great interest in transaction-cost
economics, the hostage can use some or all of contract returns, which ex-
post will have quasi-rent characteristics. The hostage may even be
enhanced by the use of auxiliary devices such as restrictive covenants. It
does matter, however, who incurs the sunk cost of specific investment:
value is expected to be returned to the holder of property rights in the
investment and incurring the sunk cost usually defines the property right.
Franchise contracts give an excellent illustration of the systematic
development of 'mini-hostages' that are matched to particular forms of
contractual discipline.
The legal system surrounding the extra-legal enforcement of
promises in franchise systems is extremely important in allowing 'hostages'
to be formed. Therefore, the self-supporting nature of contracts is
important but should not be overestimated. Legal and extra-legal
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enforcement tend to be complementary forms of governance. One example
of the importance of the quality of law is the effect of limits on franchise
termination--once franchisees are confident about protection from
opportunistic appropriation of their investments, they are more likely to buy
franchises and franchise returns improve. The restrictions are typically
simplifying in character. The examples of legal and extra-legal
enforcement in this paper have revealed a rich adaptation to the demands of
evolving franchise systems.
